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I 
    between internalists and externalists 
in epistemology, one notion that seems particularly resistant to 
an externalist treatment is that of rationality. Perhaps I can fail to 
know or even be justiﬁed in believing that p without having epistemic 
access to whatever it is that deprives me of knowledge or justiﬁcation. 
However, can it be irrational for me to believe that p when part of what 
makes that the case is outside my cognitive grasp, when from my ﬁrst-
person perspective everything indicates that it would be perfectly ap-
propriate for me to so believe? Rationality seems to involve doing the 
best one can with what one has, and to posit an externalist standard 
of rationality according to which it can be irrational for one to believe 
a given proposition despite one’s not being able, even upon reﬂection, 
to realize that this is so at best sounds like a strained use of the word 
‘irrational’, and at worst appears to be changing the subject.
Not so, according to Timothy Williamson. In Knowledge and Its Limits, 
Williamson provides a sorites-like argument for the conclusion that no 
plausible standard of rationality meets the constraint that its demands 
are always accessible to the subject. In Williamsonian parlance, the 
fact that it would be irrational of one to believe that p is not luminous, 
for that fact can obtain without one’s being in a position to know that 
it obtains. So not only is an externalist notion of rationality fully coher-
ent, but it is the only game in town: even if we posit two notions of 
rationality, one of which (rationality  ) is claimed to be externalist and 
the other of which (rationality  ) is claimed not to be, the latter will be 
just as susceptible to Williamson’s argument as the former. Therefore 
those who cling to the idea that rationality is inherently internalistic 
should cast o their prejudices and learn to love the bomb; sometimes 
we lack access to the demands of rationality, but such is our lot, and to 
hope for things to be otherwise is to quixotically yearn after an impos-
sible cognitive standard.
Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument has further consequences. 
If sound, not only would it show that it can be irrational for one to 
believe a given proposition without one’s being in a position to know 
.  Williamson (). All page references in the text are to this book.
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from the truth of these matters need accept his equally radical claims 
about our inevitable cognitive homelessness.
õ 7ILLIAMSONSõ#OREõ!RGUMENT
In Williamson’s terminology, a condition  is luminous if and only if the 
following holds:
  (*)  For every case α, if in α condition  obtains, then in α one 
is in a position to know that  obtains.
What Williamson calls cases are what Lewis, following Quine, calls 
centered possible worlds: possible worlds with a designated subject 
and a designated time. Williamsonian conditions, on the other hand, 
are in eect centered states-of-aairs: a condition either obtains or 
fails to obtain in a given case, and each condition can be speciﬁed by a 
that-clause in which the pronoun “one” refers to the case’s designated 
subject and the present tense refers to the case’s designated time. So, 
for example, the condition that one has hands obtains in a case α if and 
only if in α the subject of α has hands at the time of α. The expression 
“in a position to know” in (*) is potentially obscure, but for our purpos-
es we only need the following: according to Williamson, “if one is in a 
position to know p, and one has done what one is in a position to do 
to decide whether p is true, then one does know p” (p. ). The basic 
idea of (*), therefore, is that if a luminous condition obtains in a given 
case, then if one does not already know that the condition obtains, one 
could come to know that it does merely by taking the time to carefully 
reﬂect on the matter.
There  are  many  conditions  that  are  uncontroversially  non-lumi-
nous, such as that one has hands (someone who is blind and paralyzed 
might have hands but not be in a position to know that she does). But 
there are also many conditions that it is extremely natural to take to be 
luminous, such as:
that one is in pain;
that one feels cold;
that it appears to one that p;
that it is, but it would also establish that one can be in pain without 
one’s being in a position to know that one is; that one can seem to see a 
certain color without one’s being in a position to know that one does; 
that two words can mean the same thing in one’s idiolect without one’s 
being in a position to know that they do; and that a given proposi-
tion can be part of one’s evidence without one’s being in a position to 
know that it is. In other words, the argument would show that one’s 
current mental life, the meanings of one’s words, the extent of one’s 
evidence, and the dictates of rationality are all non-luminous — that 
each can, at least in principle, be epistemically inaccessible to a given 
subject. If Williamson is right, then we are (as he puts it) “cognitively 
homeless”: there is no substantive domain of mental or semantic or 
normative facts to which we have guaranteed access, no subportion 
of our mental or semantic or normative lives within which everything 
lies open to view.
However, we need not accept Williamson’s argument. Luminosity 
is a kind of epistemic privileged access: it involves a subject’s always 
being in a position to know that a given fact obtains, whenever it does 
obtain. I will argue that Williamson’s argument only succeeds if he as-
sumes that we do not have a kind of doxastic privileged access (as we 
might put it) to the facts in question, for his argument presupposes that 
there does not exist a certain sort of constitutive connection between 
the obtaining of the given facts and our beliefs about the obtaining of 
those facts. The exact nature of this connection will depend on the ver-
sion of Williamson’s argument that one is considering: as we shall see, 
there are two versions of the anti-luminosity argument, depending on 
whether one defends the argument’s crucial premise in terms of “all or 
nothing” belief or in terms of degrees of belief. But in either case, the 
thesis at the level of belief that Williamson must deny in order to se-
cure his results at the level of knowledge is one that is independently 
plausible, and one to which defenders of luminosity will readily help 
themselves; to simply assume its falsity would beg the main question 
at issue. Only those who follow Williamson in his radical claims about 
how, even after ideal reﬂection, our beliefs about our mental lives, the 
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course of the morning that one is not aware of any change in those 
feelings from one millisecond to the next. Let t , t , t , … tn be a series 
of times at one-millisecond intervals from dawn to noon. For each in-
teger i such that  ≤ i ≤ n, let αi be the case at time ti on the morning in 
question. Finally, let  be the condition that one feels cold, let  be the 
condition that one knows that one feels cold, and let  be the condition 
that one is in a position to know that one feels cold. Williamson’s argument 
then proceeds as follows.
First,  Williamson  has  us  assume  for  reductio  that  the  condition 
that one feels cold is indeed luminous. It follows that, for each integer i 
( ≤ i ≤ n), if in αi one feels cold, then in αi one is in a position to know 
that one feels cold:
  () ( i,  ≤ i ≤ n)( obtains in αi  5   obtains in αi ).
Second, Williamson notes that since in each αi one is doing everything 
one can to decide whether one feels cold, it follows from his stipulation 
about the meaning of the expression “being in a position to know” that 
if in αi one is in a position to know that one feels cold, then in αi one 
does in fact know that one feels cold. Thus we have the following:
 ( )  (i,  ≤ i ≤ n)( obtains in αi  5   obtains in αi ).
Third, Williamson appeals to what is perhaps the single most impor-
tant assumption in his entire book. According to Williamson, knowl-
edge requires safety from error: in order for one to know something, one 
must not have been easily wrong in coming to believe it. Much more 
will be said about Williamson’s safety requirement in Sections  and , 
below, but for now the following comments will suce. Suppose that 
in case αi one believes that one feels cold. Williamson insists that in 
order for one’s belief in αi to be safe enough to constitute knowledge, 
one’s belief must not be false in any similar case that one cannot dis-
criminate from αi. Now one such case is αi+ , the case one millisecond 
later, so it follows that if one knows in case αi that one feels cold, it must 
still be true in αi+ that one feels cold. As this reasoning will work just 
that one believes that q;
that words X and Y have the same meaning for one;
that one’s evidence includes the proposition that r;
that one’s evidence appears to include the proposition that s;
that it is rational for one to believe that t;
that it is rational for one to do ϕ.
Williamson argues that each of these conditions is not luminous; as 
he sees it, the only conditions that might, perhaps, be luminous are 
trivial conditions that either obtain in every case (such as the condi-
tion that one exists) or obtain in none (such as the impossible condition, 
for which (*) vacuously holds).
Williamson’s central anti-luminosity argument has the following 
form. Let us ﬁx on the condition that one feels cold, which Williamson 
takes to be as good a candidate for a luminous condition as any; later 
the argument will be generalized so as to apply to almost any puta-
tively luminous condition. Williamson begins by asking us to “con-
sider a morning on which one feels freezing cold at dawn, very slowly 
warms up, and feels hot by noon” (p. ). We can stipulate that during 
this entire process, one does everything one can to decide whether or 
not one feels cold. We can also suppose that there is no other relevant 
change in the situation over time: all one does for the entire morning 
is sit there focusing on how hot or cold one feels as the temperature 
slowly gets warmer. Moreover, we can make the plausible assump-
tion that one’s feelings of hot and cold change so gradually during the 
.  Although the details of his position have changed over the years, the phi-
losopher who comes closest to explicitly endorsing a set of luminosity claims 
that play a central role in his epistemology is Roderick Chisholm; see his 
(), pp. –; (), pp. –; (), pp. –; and (), pp. –. 
However, most epistemological internalists are also committed to luminosity 
claims of one form or another.
.  See Williamson (), ch. . An earlier version of the argument can be found 
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luminous by considering a series of cases in which one at ﬁrst clearly 
sees a computer but then one’s eyesight gradually gets blurrier and 
blurrier. Perhaps we could even argue that the condition that words X 
and Y have the same meaning is not luminous by considering a series of 
cases in which “two synonyms … gradually diverge in meaning, as a 
mere dierence in tone grows into a dierence in application” (p. ). 
And so on. Although the details of how we construct these continua 
of cases will vary depending upon the condition in question, it seems 
plausible that if Williamson’s argument succeeds in showing that the 
condition that one feels cold is not luminous, analogous arguments could 
show that almost any other condition is not luminous. In particular, as 
a process of gradual change can take one from circumstances in which 
it is rational for one to believe that p to circumstances in which it is 
irrational for one to believe that p, we can establish that, for any sense 
of ‘rational’, the condition that it is rational for one to believe that p is not 
luminous: it can be rational, in that sense, for one to believe a given 
proposition without one’s being in a position to know that it is.
Williamson’s  anti-luminosity  argument  forms  the  backbone  of 
Knowledge and Its Limits: not only does he take it to show that no non-
trivial condition is luminous, but he also uses the argument (or vari-
ants of it) to reply to an important objection to his claim that knowl-
edge is a mental state (ch. ); to contest Dummett’s argument for an 
anti-realist theory of meaning (ch. ); to argue against a version of the 
-principle according to which one is always in a position to know 
when one knows a given proposition (ch. ); to provide a solution to 
the surprise-examination paradox (ch. ); to rebut any argument for 
skepticism about the external world that assumes that we and the en-
vatted versions of ourselves possess the same evidence (ch. ); and to 
buttress his claim that our evidence is all and only what we know (ch. ). 
Moreover, similar uses of a safety requirement on knowledge to derive 
margin-for-error principles play a crucial role in Williamson’s theory 
.  Williamson insists that such a continuum of cases exists for it is rational for 
one to believe that p at Williamson (), p. ; see also Williamson (), 
  pp. –.
as well for any integer i such that  ≤ i < n, the safety requirement on 
knowledge plus one’s limited discriminatory capabilities give us the 
following margin-for-error principle:
  () ( i,  ≤ i < n)( obtains in αi  5   obtains in αi+).
Finally, we have two last assumptions that follow merely from the de-
scription of the case:
  ()   obtains in α.
  ()   does not obtain in αn.
That is: at dawn one feels cold, and at noon one does not feel cold.
However, now contradiction looms. By (), if  obtains in α  , 
then  obtains in α. By (), if  obtains in α  , then  obtains 
in α. By (), if  obtains in α  , then  obtains in α. Therefore 
from these three conditionals and (), it follows that  obtains in 
α. Moreover, by a similar chain of reasoning, we may conclude that  
obtains in α  , that  obtains in α  , and so on, until we reach the conclu-
sion that  obtains in αn. But this contradicts (). Thus one of the 
argument’s ﬁve premises must be false. Williamson claims that (), 
(), (), and () are all unassailable, so he infers that () is 
the premise responsible for our reaching a contradiction. Conclusion: 
the condition that one feels cold is not luminous — one can feel cold 
without being in a position to know that one feels cold.
All the above argument assumes about the condition that one feels 
cold is that there exists a continuum of cases, starting from a case in 
which that condition obtains and ending with a case in which it does 
not, such that the underlying basis for the condition’s obtaining or not 
obtaining changes so gradually that one cannot discriminate a change 
in that basis from one case to the next. Thus we can run a parallel 
argument on any condition for which such a continuum exists. We 
could argue that the condition that one is in pain is not luminous by 
considering a series of cases in which one feels an agonizing pain that 
gradually subsides until one feels nothing at all. We could argue that 
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compelling to simply tollens Williamson’s ponens. Moreover, we should 
be wary of trusting our intuitions about principles that involve apply-
ing vague predicates to very similar cases: after all, the typical sorites 
premise “One hair can’t make the dierence between being bald and 
not bald” is intuitively extremely compelling. So if the only grounds 
we had in support of () were our bare intuitions about its seeming 
plausibility, those would be very thin grounds indeed, particularly in 
light of the wide variety of radical consequences that Williamson takes 
to follow from his anti-luminosity argument.
What we want is an independent motivation for (). As men-
tioned before, Williamson defends () by appealing to a safety re-
quirement on knowledge. A recurring theme in the Williamsonian 
oeuvre, from his early work on indiscriminability and vagueness on 
through his recent material more directly concerned with epistemo-
logical matters, is that in cases in which we have imperfect abilities to 
discriminate between alternatives, a safety requirement on knowledge 
plus our limited powers of discrimination yield margin-for-error prin-
ciples. A margin-for-error principle is any principle that, like (), is 
of the form “If in case α one knows that p, then in suciently similar 
case β it is true that p.” And the safety requirement is Williamson’s 
way of cashing out the idea that reliability is a necessary condition 
for knowledge: although in earlier work Williamson talks exclusively 
of a reliability constraint on knowledge without mentioning the word 
‘safety’, by Knowledge and Its Limits he passes freely back and forth be-
tween talk of reliability and talk of safety.
What exactly is Williamson’s safety requirement? And how exactly 
does it lead to the margin-for-error principle ()? Unfortunately, this 
matter is complicated by the fact that Williamson explicates the safety 
requirement in two dierent ways, the ﬁrst involving a coarse-grained, 
“all or nothing” conception of belief, the second involving a more ﬁne-
grained conception in terms of degrees of conﬁdence. So in order to 
.  Thanks to Bernhard Nickel for this point.
.  See  Williamson  (),  pp.  –;  (a),  pp.  –;  (),  pp. 
–; and (), pp. –.
of vagueness. And more generally, Williamson’s anti-luminosity argu-
ment constitutes a novel way of criticizing a venerable philosophical 
tradition — a way which Williamson uses to lay the foundation for a 
radical new theory of (as he puts it) knowledge and its limits.
õ .ARROWINGõTHEõ4ARGET
Such is Williamson’s core anti-luminosity argument; but is it sound? 
The argument works by generating a contradiction from the ﬁve prem-
ises (), (), (), (), and (). The last two of these are 
undeniable: they follow directly from the set-up of the scenario. (), 
on the other hand, one might doubt: it depends on assuming that in 
each case one has done everything one can to decide whether one 
feels cold, and some might insist that doing this takes longer than one 
millisecond. However, we can easily avoid this worry by extending 
the amount of time between successive cases while keeping the total 
number of cases the same (so that the entire process takes longer than 
a single morning), and once we change the set-up in this way, () 
seems ﬁne. Thus the crucial question when evaluating Williamson’s 
argument is whether () is more plausible than ().
Many  people,  when  ﬁrst  encountering  Williamson’s  argument, 
ﬁnd () independently plausible and so not in need of any further 
justiﬁcation. However, resting content with the prima facie plausibil-
ity of () reduces Williamson’s argument to a mere battle of intu-
itions over which of () and () one ﬁnds more plausible, and 
it would then be open to the defender of luminosity who ﬁnds () 
.  It is these margin-for-error principles that allow Williamson to explain why, 
even though on his epistemicist theory of vagueness each vague predicate has 
a sharp cut-o point, we can never know where those sharp cut-o points lie. 
See Williamson (a), §; Williamson (b), §; and Williamson (), 
ch. .
.  Actually, matters are slightly more complicated than that, for as long as one’s 
feeling of cold is continually changing between successive cases, we might 
worry that one will not be coming to a decision about a constant feeling of 
cold. So if we want to completely avoid this type of worry, we should make 
one more change to the set-up and, instead of having one’s feeling of cold 
change continuously over a given interval, have it change in incremental steps.     Luminosity Regained
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thinking of , but my belief is wrong since you are really thinking of, 
say, . Suppose I decide, out of mere pessimism, that the lottery ticket 
I just purchased is not a winning ticket; even if I end up being right, 
my belief that the ticket is not a winner does not count as knowledge. 
Why? Plausibly, because there is a very similar case in which I still 
believe out of pessimism that the ticket is not a winner, but the balls 
determining the winning ticket number bounce slightly dierently so 
as to make my ticket a winner. Of course, how one ﬁxes the similar-
ity relation between cases and what determines the threshold beyond 
which two cases do not count as suciently similar will no doubt be 
murky matters, but there seems little point in denying that (-) 
has much to be said in its favor.
It is crucial to notice that (-) is not itself a margin-for-error 
principle. According to a given margin-for-error principle, one does 
not know that p in some case if, in a certain suciently similar case, 
it is false that p. According to (-), one does not know that p 
in some case if, in a suciently similar case, it is false that p and one 
believes that p. For all (-) says, one might know that p in some 
case α despite its being false that p in an extremely similar case α*, 
provided that one does not believe that p in α*. It is only nearby false 
belief that, according to (-), blocks one from having knowledge, 
not nearby falsity of what is actually believed.
Recall that the margin-for-error principle needed for Williamson’s 
anti-luminosity argument to go through is as follows:
. Several  recent  articles  have  attempted  to  provide  counterexamples  to 
(-) as a way of resisting Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument. See 
Brueckner & Fiocco (), Neta & Rohrbaugh (), Comesaña (), 
and Conee (). For Williamson’s reply, see §I of his (forthcoming). I agree 
with Williamson’s assessment that the alleged counterexamples oered by 
these authors are not convincing: each aims to describe two suciently simi-
lar cases such that one knows a given proposition in the ﬁrst case and falsely 
believes that same proposition in the second, but for each pair of cases, either 
it is far from clear that the ﬁrst case is a genuine case of knowledge, or it is far 
from clear that the two cases are suciently similar in the relevant respects. 
(This is all the more true when the safety requirement is modiﬁed so that one 
must have suciently similar bases of belief in the two cases: see n. .)
assess the case Williamson makes for (), we should consider each 
of these ways of ﬁlling out the safety requirement in turn.
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Williamson often expresses the idea that knowledge requires safety 
from error in terms of one’s not easily being wrong in similar cases: “if 
one believes p truly in a case α, one must avoid false belief in cases suf-
ﬁciently similar to α in order to count as reliable enough to know in α” 
(p. ); “in case α one is safe from error in believing that  obtains if 
and only if there is no case close to α in which one falsely believes that 
 obtains” (pp. –); “if one knows, one could not easily have been 
wrong in a similar case. In that sense, one’s belief is safely true” (p. ). 
Passages such as these strongly suggest that the safety requirement 
involves the following necessary condition on knowledge:
 ( -)  In case α one knows that p only if, in all suciently 
similar cases in which one believes that p, it is true 
that p.
When so construed, the safety requirement has an undeniable air of 
plausibility: if it easily could have been the case that one falsely be-
lieves that p — if in an extremely similar way the world might have 
been, one believes that p and this belief is false — then one’s actual 
belief that p, even if true, does not seem secure enough to constitute 
knowledge. 
Suppose I ask you to think of a number between  and  and cor-
rectly guess that you are thinking of ; my true belief about which num-
ber you are thinking of does not count as knowledge. Why? Plausibly, 
because there is a very similar case in which I still guess that you are 
.  This coarse-grained version of a safety requirement on knowledge is roughly 
equivalent to one that Ernest Sosa has endorsed in a recent series of articles; 
see Sosa (), among other places. Note, however, that Sosa’s formulation 
of the safety requirement involves ascribing non-standard truth conditions 
to the subjunctive conditional “S would believe that p only if it were the case 
that p” — truth conditions that Williamson does not necessarily endorse: cf. 
Williamson (), p. .     Luminosity Regained
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at noon): with n uses of modus ponens on an instance of (), we can 
get from the ﬁrst of these assumptions to the negation of the second. 
So we should reject any argument that appeals to (); depending on 
one’s theory of vagueness, the principle is either less than perfectly 
true or outright false. And if Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument 
does indeed implicitly appeal to (), then that argument is open to 
the charge of illicitly exploiting the vagueness of the term ‘believes’, in 
much the same way as a typical sorites argument illicitly exploits the 
vagueness of a term such as ‘bald’ or ‘heap’.
. A  similar objection applies to attempts to save Williamson’s argument by 
appealing to a modalized version of (). It might be insisted that if one 
believes that one feels cold in case αi , then even if one does not believe that 
one feels cold in the case αi+ one millisecond later, there must exist at least 
one other possible case β similar to αi in which one has the same qualitative 
feeling of cold as in αi+ and in which one believes that one feels cold. In 
symbols:
()  (i,  c i < n)( obtains in αi  5  (β similar to αi)[Q(β)  =  Q(αi+)   
 obtains in β]),
where Q(α)  =  Q(β) signiﬁes that one’s qualitative feeling of cold is the same 
in cases α and β. (Cf. Williamson [], p. .) Moreover, it is extremely 
plausible that whether one feels cold in a given case is determined by one’s 
qualitative feeling of cold, so that if one has the same qualitative feeling of 
cold in two cases, one feels cold in one of those cases if and only if one feels 
cold in the other:
()  (α, β)[Q(α)  =  Q(β)  5  ( obtains in α  i   obtains in β)].
From (), (), (-), and the assumption that knowledge implies 
belief, we can derive (). However, just as repeatedly iterating () leads 
to unacceptable consequences, repeatedly iterating () leads to unaccept-
able — or at least highly controversial — consequences. Given the undeniable 
assumption that one believes that one feels cold in α  , repeated applications 
of () yields the result that there exists some case β in which one feels 
as hot as one does in αn (the case at noon in our original scenario), and yet 
one nonetheless believes that one feels cold. Indeed, if we tweak our original 
scenario and stipulate that in the ﬁnal case things have heated up to such a 
degree that one’s qualitative feeling of hot is the same as it would be were 
one at the center of the sun, then the defender of () is saddled with the 
result that there is a possible case β such that one feels as if one were in the center 
of the sun, and yet one believes that one feels cold. Of course, since the similarity 
relation is not transitive, β will be very distant from any case in the actual 
world. But I think we should have serious doubts that such a case is even 
possible — serious doubts that there could exist a being who counts as having 
beliefs and experiences, and yet whose beliefs and experiences are as wildly 
  () ( i,  ≤ i < n)( obtains in αi  5   obtains in αi+ ).
How  can  one  derive  ()  from  (-)?  Let  us  concede  to 
Williamson that each case αi is suciently similar to the case αi+ one 
millisecond later. Then if  is the condition that one believes that one feels 
cold, straightforward substitution into (-) yields the following:
  () ( i,  ≤ i < n)[ obtains in αi  5  ( obtains in αi+  5   
 obtains in αi+ )].
So in order for us to be able to use the coarse-grained version of the 
safety requirement to justify the crucial premise of Williamson’s anti-
luminosity argument, we must somehow get from () to ().
How to do so is not dicult to see. Williamson’s guiding thought is 
that for cases in which we have limited discriminatory capabilities, the 
safety requirement on knowledge gives rise to a margin-for-error prin-
ciple. So what we need is some premise encapsulating our subject’s 
inability to discriminate the cases αi from one millisecond to the next. 
The most obvious candidate is as follows:
  () ( i,  ≤ i < n)( obtains in αi  5   obtains in αi+ ).
The basic idea behind () is that because the change from ti to ti+ 
in the underlying basis for one’s belief that one feels cold is beyond 
the threshold of one’s discriminatory capacities, one’s belief at ti+ as to 
whether one feels cold will be the same as one’s belief at ti. () is a 
natural way of articulating the idea that one cannot discriminate case αi 
from case αi+ with regards to how cold one feels — that, as Williamson 
puts it, there is “limited discrimination in the belief-forming process” 
(p. ). Moreover, once we have (), () follows from (), given 
the additional assumption that knowledge implies belief.
So have we managed to adequately justify ()? No, we have 
not — for the crucial premise () is a sorites premise. Indeed, () by it-
self is enough to generate a sorites paradox from the undeniable as-
sumptions that (i) one believes that one feels cold in case α (i. e., at 
dawn), and (ii) one does not believe that one feels cold in case αn (i. e.,      Luminosity Regained
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the instances of (). The basic purpose of () in Williamson’s 
anti-luminosity argument is as a bridge principle between cases. From 
() and () it only follows that if some condition obtains in a given 
case, then some other condition obtains in that same case; with (), 
on the other hand, we can deduce that because a certain condition ob-
tains in case αi , a certain other condition must obtain in the successive 
case αi+. However, (-) will be unable to fully undergird (), 
since (-) can act as a bridge principle between successive cases 
αi and αi+ only if one believes that one feels cold in both; as this will 
not be true for all integers i such that  ≤ i < n, we will need some other 
bridge principle to secure () in those cases, and I claim that what-
ever this additional principle is, it will be implausible.
One might reply on Williamson’s behalf: all we need in order to run 
the reductio is a single case in which one falsely believes that one feels 
cold, so we don’t need to go all the way to αn. Suppose there is some 
integer j such that: (i) for every non-negative integer i < j, both  and 
 obtain in αi , and (ii)  obtains in αj but  does not. Then we could 
use (), (), (), and () to generate the contradictory result 
that  both does and does not obtain in αj. However, who is to say that 
such a j exists — that as one gradually gets warmer and warmer during 
the course of the morning while carefully attending to how cold one 
feels, one stops feeling cold before one stops believing that one feels 
cold? Williamson appears willing to grant to his opponent that there 
might be “a constitutive connection between the obtaining of the con-
dition [that one feels cold] and one’s judging it to obtain” (p. ), and 
some candidates for such a constitutive connection rule out the possi-
bility that our subject stops feeling cold before she stops believing that 
she feels cold. The weakest version of a constitutive connection that 
has this result is the following:
. A   number  of  authors  in  the  philosophy  of  mind  literature  have  recently 
defended  accounts  according  to  which  there  is  a  constitutive  connection 
between  experience  and  (the  exercise  of)  certain  so-called  phenomenal 
concepts, which in turn gives rise to a corresponding constitutive connection 
between experience and certain phenomenal beliefs that employ those con-
However, might not Williamson derive () from () by means 
of some principle other than ()? Another obvious candidate is
  () ( i,  ≤ i < n)( obtains in αi  5   obtains in αi+ ).
()  and  ()  together  yield  (),  without  our  even  having  to 
assume that knowledge implies belief. But what is the independent 
motivation for (), other than its being what Williamson needs in 
order to derive ()? It’s not as if () encapsulates some dictum 
about the subject’s inability to discriminate between successive cas-
es — or if it does, it only does so derivatively, in virtue of being implied 
by () and the claim that knowledge implies belief. And it doesn’t 
seem plausible that () follows from some more general claim that 
knowing that p in some case requires that one believe that p in all 
suciently similar cases. Suppose I know a given proposition in the 
actual case; in a very similar case I might be suspending judgment 
on the matter, or irrationally clinging to a belief in the proposition’s 
negation. Why should that bar me from knowing in the actual case? 
Though knowledge might indeed require a protective belt of cases in 
which one does not falsely believe, it is extremely implausible to sup-
pose that, in addition, knowledge requires a protective belt of cases in 
which one believes.
But  more  importantly,  and  independent  of  the  speciﬁc  failings 
of () and (), the more general point is this: if one knows that 
p in some case, (-) has nothing to say about similar cases in 
which one does not believe that p; at some point during the morn-
ing one will stop believing that one feels cold; so (-) has noth-
ing to say about whether one really does feel cold from that point on. 
In particular, as it is incontestable that  does not obtain in case αn , 
() — and hence (-) — will be completely useless in deriving 
the conditional “ obtains in αn-  5   obtains in αn ,” which is one of 
at odds with one another as they would be in β. To think otherwise is to think 
that the cognitive and phenomenal realms can come apart from each other to 
an unacceptable degree. (Compare the discussion of Sosa’s thought experi-
ment in Section  below.)     Luminosity Regained
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from the basis on which [one] believes p in the case in which [one] 
putatively knows p” (p. ). Williamson seems to be suggesting that a 
more accurate version of the coarse-grained safety requirement would 
read as follows:
 ( -)  In case α one knows that p on basis b only if, in any 
suciently similar case α* in which one believes that 
p on a suciently similar basis b*, it is true that p.
Suppose that in some case α one believes that p on a given basis, and 
in a suciently similar case β one believes that p on a very dierent 
basis (perhaps one believes that p by perception in case α and by testi-
mony in case β). Then (-) captures the very natural idea that if 
one’s belief is true in α and false in β, one’s false belief in β should not 
impugn the reliability (and hence the status as knowledge) of one’s 
true belief in α: after all, one came to believe that p on a very dierent 
basis in each case.
Thus the shift from (-) to (-) lends more plausibility 
to the claim that safety is indeed a necessary condition for knowledge. 
However, one thing that the shift to (-) does not do is provide 
any help with the criticisms raised earlier against the possibility of de-
riving () from a coarse-grained version of the safety requirement. 
As before, let us grant to Williamson for the sake of argument that (-
) is true. Then in order to use that constraint to derive the rel-
evant margin-for-error principle (), we need it to be the case that if 
in some case αi on the morning in question one knows that one feels 
cold on a given basis for belief, then in the case αi+ one millisecond 
later one believes that one feels cold on a suciently similar basis. But 
if one believes on a suciently similar basis that one feels cold, then a 
fortiori one believes simpliciter that one feels cold. Thus, just as in our 
.  The shift to (-) also provides one more tool in resisting the would-be 
counterexamples to the safety requirement mentioned in n. , since many 
of those examples ﬁx on two cases in which the bases of one’s belief are not 
suciently similar (especially if we individuate bases of belief externally, so 
that phenomenologically indistinguishable bases of belief need not count as 
suciently similar).
  ()  If one has done everything one can to decide whether 
one feels cold, then one believes that one feels cold 
only if one feels cold.
Since on the morning in question our subject has done everything she 
can to decide whether she feels cold, it would follow from () that 
she never believes that she feels cold on that morning without in fact 
feeling cold. Of course one might doubt that there exists a constitutive 
connection of this form between feeling cold and believing that one 
feels cold, but then we need some independent argument against the 
possibility of such a connection, which the anti-luminosity argument 
by itself does not provide. Indeed, as Williamson himself notes (p. ), 
typically it is precisely because they think that there is a tight connection 
between certain mental states and beliefs about those states that some 
philosophers claim the mental states in question to be luminous. So 
to simply assume that () is false would beg the question against 
the defender of luminosity.
I conclude that (-) is unable by itself to motivate the mar-
gin-for-error principle (). However, at times Williamson talks as if 
(-) is only a ﬁrst approximation to the proper coarse-grained 
version of the safety requirement. “A more elaborate account on such 
lines,” he writes, “would qualify ‘[one] believes p’ in the conditional 
to exclude cases in which [one] believes p on a quite dierent basis 
cepts: see Papineau (), ch. ; Chalmers (); Block (); and Balog 
(forthcoming).
.  See, for example, Chisholm (), p. , and (), p. .
.  In his (), Brian Weatherson reaches a similar conclusion that a coarse-
grained version of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument would be blocked 
if on the morning in question one believes that one feels cold only if one feels 
cold. Weatherson makes the point by considering the possibility that the very 
same brain state might constitute the state of one’s feeling cold and the state 
of one’s believing that one feels cold, but we need not make so strong an 
assumption in order to block the argument: all we need is the much weaker 
claim (). Moreover, Weatherson fails to consider how this insight can be 
extended to Williamson’s ocial defense of () in terms of a ﬁne-grained 
version of the safety requirement.     Luminosity Regained
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For most of Knowledge and Its Limits, when Williamson discusses the 
safety requirement it is the coarse-grained version of the safety re-
quirement that is explicitly mentioned. And when Williamson pro-
vides a formal model of how luminosity might fail (pp. –), his 
model invokes a conception of safety formulated in terms of coarse-
grained, “all or nothing” belief. However, during Williamson’s ocial 
defense of (), he instead appeals to a more ﬁne-grained notion of 
can we abandon these attempts to derive () from a coarse-grained safety 
requirement, and instead attempt to derive it from a safety-like requirement 
that makes no reference to belief? The safety-like requirement that readily 
springs to mind is the following:
()  In case α one knows that p only if, in all suciently similar cases, 
it is true that p.
However, () is extremely implausible, for reasons similar to those given 
against (): why should its not being the case that p in nearby cases ob-
struct my knowing that p in the actual case if I don’t believe that p, or even 
engage in any belief-forming process vaguely similar to that which I used in 
forming or retaining my belief that p, in those nearby cases? Indeed, unless 
we severely restrict what counts as a suciently similar case, () would 
appear to block almost any belief from counting as knowledge. For example, 
suppose I am gazing at a leaf on a nearby tree and truly believe that I am see-
ing a green leaf. Presumably a case whose only dierence from the actual one 
consists in the leaf in question being brown, or in its not being in front of my 
gaze since it has already fallen to the ground, is similar in nearly all respects 
to the actual one; yet if we count such cases as suciently similar, we are sad-
dled with the absurd consequence that I do not know that I am seeing a green 
leaf in the actual case. Of course, we could deem these cases as not being suf-
ﬁciently similar, but then we lose the ability of () to explain the examples 
used to motivate a safety-like requirement in the ﬁrst place—for instance, in 
the lottery example there are any number of dierences between the actual 
case in which my lottery ticket is a winner and the counterfactual case in 
which my lottery ticket is a loser that are far greater than a dierence in the 
color or position of one mere leaf. As such we would need some new motiva-
tion for taking () to be a genuine necessary condition on knowledge, and 
how we provide such a motivation is not readily apparent. But more press-
ingly, the defender of () who counts the counterfactual leaf cases as not 
suciently similar to the actual case presumably does so partially in virtue 
of the dierences in one’s beliefs between the actual and counterfactual cases, 
which would imply that a counterfactual case only counts as suciently simi-
lar if one has all the same beliefs in that case as in the actual case; however, 
this makes () a mere notational variant of (-), and thus all the same 
problems will arise as before when one attempts to use () to derive ().
attempt to derive () using (-) as the only bridge principle 
between cases, in order to derive () using (-) as the only 
bridge principle it must be true that one believes that one feels cold in 
each successive case. And as this is not true for the morning in ques-
tion, it will be impossible to use (-) to motivate () without 
appealing to some sorites-premise-like principle to the eect that if 
one believes that one feels cold on a given basis in case αi , then one 
believes that one feels cold on a suciently similar basis in the sub-
sequent case αi+. But we should reject any argument that appeals to 
such a principle. So moving to (-) is of no help in attempting 
to derive () from the safety requirement., 
.  At one point Williamson mentions in passing a third version of a coarse-
grained safety requirement, one that provides even less support for () 
than the other two. Williamson writes, “If at time t on basis b one knows p, 
and at a time t* close enough t on a basis b* close enough to b one believes a 
proposition p* close enough to p, then p* should be true” (p. ). This quota-
tion suggests the following version of a coarse-grained safety requirement:
(- )  In case α one knows that p on basis b only if, in any suf-
ﬁciently similar case α* in which one believes a suciently 
similar proposition that p* on a suciently similar basis b*, 
it is true that p*.
(- ) avoids one problem that potentially faces (-) and (--
): we might want to use the safety requirement to rule out lucky guesses 
about necessary truths from being knowledge, but if I correctly guess, say, that 
 is prime, there will be no suciently similar cases in which I falsely be-
lieve that  is prime, since what I believe is true in every possible case. (Cf. 
Sainsbury [], p. ; Weatherson [], p. ; Williamson [], pp. 
–; and Williamson [], p. .) However, as a means of motivating 
(), (- ) fares even worse than (-) and (-). As one 
gradually feels warmer and warmer on the morning in question, eventually 
one will stop believing that one feels cold and instead believe a proposition 
that one might express by saying, “I feel coldish.” So (- ), plus various 
background assumptions about the sucient similarity of both the proposi-
tions believed and the bases on which one believes them, will yield the result 
that if in the previous case one knew that one felt cold, then in the present 
case it must be true that one feels coldish. And repeated appeals to (- ) 
in this way will eventually yield the result that in αn one feels hot — hardly an 
absurd conclusion!
.  The recurring problem in these attempts to motivate () by means of a 
coarse-grained version of the safety requirement is that, in each case, we need 
some way of ensuring that one continues to believe that one feels cold from 
one millisecond to the next on the morning in question. Thus we might ask:      Luminosity Regained
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that one feels cold is not reliably based, for one’s almost 
equal conﬁdence on a similar basis a millisecond earlier 
that one felt cold was mistaken. In picturesque terms, that 
large portion of one’s conﬁdence at ti that one still has 
at ti+ is misplaced. Even if one’s conﬁdence at ti was just 
enough to count as belief, while one’s conﬁdence at ti+ 
falls just short of belief, what constituted that belief at 
ti was largely misplaced conﬁdence; the belief fell short 
of knowledge. One’s conﬁdence at ti was reliably based 
in the way required for knowledge only if one feels cold 
  at ti+.
In this argument, Williamson appears to be implicitly appealing to the 
following principle:
  (-)  In case α one’s belief that p with degree of conﬁdence 
c is reliably based in the way required for knowledge 
only if, in any suciently similar case α* in which one 
has an at-most-slightly-lower degree of conﬁdence c* 
that p, it is true that p. 
Moreover, merely in virtue of the description of the scenario, the fol-
lowing holds for the cases αi under discussion:
  ()  For every integer i ( ≤ i < n), if in αi one has degree of 
conﬁdence c that one feels cold, then in αi+ one has 
an at-most-slightly-lower degree of conﬁdence c* that 
one feels cold. 
(-) and (), together with our usual assumption that each 
.  More precisely, Williamson appears to be appealing to a principle according 
to which one’s belief that p with a certain degree of conﬁdence constitutes 
knowledge in a given case only if, in any suciently similar case in which 
one believes that p with a suciently similar degree of conﬁdence and on a 
suciently similar basis, it is true that p. (Compare the discussion of (-) 
at the end of Section .) However, for ease of exposition I shall ignore this 
complication in what follows, since nothing in my criticism of Williamson’s 
argument depends on issues concerning the basis of one’s belief.
safety: as Williamson puts it, his argument here “depends on apply-
ing reliability considerations in a subtler way to degrees of conﬁdence” 
(p. ). I suspect that Williamson constructs the ocial argument in 
terms of a ﬁne-grained version of the safety requirement speciﬁcally 
because he wants the argument to hold even if something like () 
is true: the real anti-luminosity argument is supposed to be one that 
even the staunchest defender of constitutive connections must accept. 
The  problem,  however,  is  that  whereas  the  coarse-grained  concep-
tion of safety is at least somewhat compelling as a way of articulating 
the general idea that knowledge requires reliably true belief, the ﬁne-
grained version has no such appeal. Or so I shall argue.
It will help if I quote Williamson’s initial justiﬁcation of () in 
terms of degrees of conﬁdence in its entirety (p. ):
Consider a time ti between t and tn , and suppose that at 
ti one knows that one feels cold. Thus one is at least rea-
sonably conﬁdent that one feels cold, for otherwise one 
would not know. Moreover, this conﬁdence must be reli-
ably based, for otherwise one would still not know that 
one feels cold. Now at ti+ one is almost equally conﬁdent 
that one feels cold, by the description of the case. So if 
one does not feel cold at ti+ , then one’s conﬁdence at ti 
.  Williamson has a very peculiar notion of degrees of conﬁdence: although 
one’s degree of conﬁdence in a given proposition is that which (when there 
is enough of it) constitutes outright belief in that proposition, Williamson in-
sists that degrees of conﬁdence “should not be equated with subjective prob-
abilities as measured by one’s betting behavior” (p. ). A better indicator of 
one’s degree of conﬁdence in a given proposition, he claims, is the degree to 
which one is willing to use that proposition as a premise in practical reason-
ing (p. ). Nothing I say in what follows turns on the distinction between 
Williamsonian degrees of belief/conﬁdence and degrees of belief/conﬁdence 
more traditionally construed. Indeed, everything I go on to say will be just as 
convincing if one replaces all occurrences of the expression ‘degree of conﬁ-
dence’ with ‘degree to which one is willing to use the proposition in question 
as a premise in practical reasoning’ (although doing so may make it more 
natural to measure these degrees on a scale from - to , with  representing 
complete willingness to use the proposition as a practical premise and - rep-
resenting complete willingness to use the proposition’s negation as a practi-
cal premise, instead of the  to  scale that I assume throughout).     Luminosity Regained
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that p? Of course, how one cashes out this “tapering o” metaphor will 
depend upon one’s theory of vagueness, but the main point remains: 
(-)  deems  as  unreliable  belief-forming  mechanisms  that  ap-
pear to be as reliable as they could possibly be.
To  illustrate  this  point,  we  can  use  a  slightly  altered  version  of 
Williamson’s own example of a subject gradually feeling warmer on a 
given morning. The basic idea is that if we are going to go ﬁne-grained 
with respect to belief, we should also go ﬁne-grained with respect to 
one’s feelings of hot or cold. So let us suppose it were possible to mea-
sure the intensity of one’s subjective feeling of cold using some set of 
units — call these units “freezons”. To ﬁx on some numbers, let us say 
that, on the given morning, one’s feeling of hot or cold is at a level of  
freezons at time t (dawn) and a level of – freezons at time tn (noon). 
Let us also suppose that the following is true: at any time one’s degree 
of conﬁdence that one feels cold on that morning directly correlates to 
one’s subjective feeling of cold as measured in freezons (see Figure  
on the following page). If we wanted to be precise, we could encapsu-
late this correlation with the following equation: if c (ti) is one’s degree 
of conﬁdence at time ti that one feels cold (measured on a scale from 
 to ), and f (ti) one’s feelings of hot or cold at ti as measured in freez-
ons, then f (ti)   =    c (ti)  –   freezons. Maybe human subjects who 
are carefully considering how cold they feel would have this sort of a 
correlation in their freezon/degree-of-conﬁdence levels; maybe they 
wouldn’t. For the purposes of my example it doesn’t matter—all I need 
is for it to be possible that there could exist a being with such a cor-
. Note that in raising these possibilities, I do not mean to be making any claims 
(at least for now) about the accuracy of any actual human’s degrees of con-
ﬁdence over time. Rather, my purpose here is to cast doubt on (-) 
by describing possible subjects for whom the principle gives implausible 
results.
.  This assumes that one’s degree of conﬁdence that one feels cold is  at dawn 
and  at noon, but we could easily adjust the equation so that one’s degree of 
conﬁdence that one feels cold is nearly  at dawn and nearly  at noon.
case αi is suciently similar to its subsequent case αi+, imply the de-
sired margin-for-error principle, ():
  ()  For every integer i ( ≤ i < n), if in αi one knows that one 
feels cold, then in αi+ one feels cold. 
Unlike () or (), () seems indisputable, given the description 
of the situation at hand. However, why should we believe (-)?
The crucial step in Williamson’s justiﬁcation of (-) is his in-
sistence that if in case α one has a degree of conﬁdence that p just 
barely enough to constitute full-ﬂedged belief, then that belief is not 
safe/reliable enough to constitute knowledge whenever it is false that 
p in some suciently similar case α* in which one has a slightly less 
degree of conﬁdence that p, even if one’s degree of conﬁdence that p in α* is 
not enough to constitute full-ﬂedged belief. It is this feature that allows (-
) to be a bridge principle where (-) could not be — that 
allows us to continue to conclude that one feels cold in successive 
cases αi even after one’s belief that one feels cold has given out. But 
why should we withhold the honoriﬁc ‘reliable’ in the kinds of cases 
Williamson describes? What if one’s degree of conﬁdence in its being 
the case that p perfectly tracks the underlying basis for its being the 
case that p, so that one’s degree of conﬁdence that p falls just short of 
belief at the precise point at which things fall just short of making it 
the case that p? Why would that be a situation in which one’s initial 
belief that p is not reliable enough to constitute knowledge? Or slight-
ly more realistically — since Williamson seems to be making the con-
tentious assumption that there is a precise cut-o point above which 
one’s degree of conﬁdence always constitutes full-ﬂedged belief and 
below which one’s degree of conﬁdence always does not constitute 
full-ﬂedged belief — what if one’s belief that p tapers o (as it were) 
just as its being the case that p tapers o, and in precisely the same 
way? In such a situation, why should one’s lower degree of conﬁdence 
that p when it is not the case that p in any way impugn the reliability 
of one’s slightly higher degree of conﬁdence that p when it is the case      Luminosity Regained
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the cases in which one does and does not believe that one feels cold, 
the penumbral connection ensures that those cut-o points are the 
same. Again, it seems evident that one could be a being for whom this 
is the case.
But now the crucial point comes: if one is such that all of the above 
is true, then according to (-), at some point during the morning 
one’s belief that one feels cold is too unreliable to constitute knowl-
edge. However, this just seems wrong: one’s beliefs about whether 
one feels cold appear to be as reliable as they possibly could be. This 
point is most easily illustrated if we sharpen the terms ‘believes’ and 
‘feels cold’ so that they do, in fact, have sharp cut-o points. Suppose 
that the sharp cut-o for belief is at . degrees of conﬁdence: when-
ever one has a degree of conﬁdence that p greater than ., one counts 
as believing that p, and whenever one has a degree of conﬁdence that 
p less than or equal to ., one counts as not believing that p. It fol-
lows from our penumbral connection between ‘believes’ and ‘feels 
cold’ that the sharp cut-o for feeling cold is  freezons. Now let αj be 
the last case during the course of the morning such that, on our sharp-
ening of ‘believes’, one counts as believing that one feels cold. Then in 
αj, one’s degree of conﬁdence that one feels cold is . + δ (for some 
small real number δ > ), and one’s feeling of cold is at a level of  + ε 
freezons (for some small real number ε > ). In case αj+ one millisec-
ond later, one’s degree of conﬁdence that one feels cold is . − δ (for 
some small real number δ´ ≥ ), and one’s feeling of cold is at a level 
of  − ε´ freezons (for some small real number ε´ ≥ ). So (assuming 
that αj is suciently similar to αj+ and that . + δ and . − δ´ are 
. Does doing so stack the deck against Williamson? No, it does not. First, as 
Williamson himself points out (p. ), if the argument for () is no longer 
cogent when we sharpen the relevant vague expressions, then that gives us 
reason to suspect that () only seems plausible because it exploits in an il-
licit manner the vagueness of its key terms (just as the fact that a typical sorites 
premise becomes obviously false when ‘bald’ or ‘heap’ is sharpened reveals 
that the premise is only plausible because it exploits in an illicit manner the 
vagueness of ‘bald’ or ‘heap’). And second, on Williamson’s own epistemicist 
theory of vagueness each of the relevant terms already has a sharp cut-o 
point, so there is no need to sharpen.
relation between its freezon and degrees-of-conﬁdence levels, which 


















































































Finally, let us make one last supposition about our scenario. Let 
one’s conﬁdence in how cold one feels that morning be so well-attuned 
that the following penumbral connection obtains between the vague 
expressions ‘believes’ and ‘feels cold’: one believes that one feels cold 
if and only if one feels cold. Then if we sharpen ‘believes’ and ‘feels 
cold’ so that there is a precise cut-o point between the cases in which 
one does and does not feel cold and a precise cut-o point between 
. See Fine (), p. . (Note that my invocation of a penumbral connection 
at this point does not commit me to a supervaluationist theory of vagueness 
similar to the one defended by Fine in that article: advocates of any theory of 
vagueness can countenance the existence of penumbral connections.)     Luminosity Regained
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in Figure , it is perfectly acceptable to insist that if one’s degree-of-
conﬁdence proﬁle were as in Figure , one’s degree of conﬁdence in 
case αj that one feels cold would not, in fact, be reliable enough to 















































































It is not clear to me that, even after sharpening the relevant terms, 
the degree-of-conﬁdence proﬁle given in Figure  represents the ideal 
epistemic state that one might have on that morning. However, let 
. Whether this is so depends on issues outside the scope of this paper, such 
as whether truth is both the aim of belief and the aim of degree of belief, or 
whether instead there is something else (degree of truth? objective chance?) 
that stands to degree of belief/conﬁdence as truth stands to belief.
suciently similar degrees of conﬁdence), Williamson’s ﬁne-grained 
safety requirement (-) implies that one’s degree of conﬁdence 
that one feels cold in αj is too unreliable to constitute knowledge, since 
in αj+ one’s level of cold as measured in freezons slips just below the 
threshold of what counts as feeling cold (so that it will be false in case 
αj+ that one feels cold). However, this charge of unreliability seems 
daft: in αj+ one’s level of cold as measured in freezons does indeed 
slip just below the threshold of what counts as feeling cold, but at 
precisely the same point one’s degree of conﬁdence that one feels cold 
slips just below the threshold of what counts as believing that one feels 
cold. Should we then follow Williamson in saying that, “in picturesque 
terms”, the large portion of one’s conﬁdence at tj that one still has at tj+ 
is misplaced? I think not.
Now one might have legitimate qualms about the notion of freez-
ons that I have helped myself to in this example. How do we measure 
these freezons? How do we ﬁx their value both inter-personally and 
intra-personally across time? And what entitles us to move from the 
familiar fact that some feelings of cold are more intense than others 
to the more substantive claim that there is a total ordering of feelings 
of cold by their intensity, let alone a total ordering that has the same 
structure as an interval on the real line? However, we should note that 
people can — and have — raised these exact same worries about de-
grees of belief. Freezons are problematic; but so too, in my opinion, are 
degrees of belief/conﬁdence.
A better objection would be to insist that, once we have sharpened 
‘believes’ and ‘feels cold’, the ideal epistemic state is not one in which 
(as in Figure ) one’s degree of conﬁdence that one feels cold directly 
correlates to one’s feeling of cold as measured in freezons, but rather 
one in which (as in Figure ) one is absolutely certain that one feels 
cold until the ﬁrst case in which one stops feeling cold, at which point 
one’s degree of conﬁdence suddenly drops to  and stays that way 
for the remainder of the morning. But then, the objection continues, 
since the degree-of-conﬁdence proﬁle given in Figure  fails to come 
close enough to the ideally reliable degree-of-conﬁdence proﬁle given      Luminosity Regained
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among the degree-of-conﬁdence proﬁles for which one’s belief that 
one feels cold always counts as being suitably reliable, some of those 
degree-of-conﬁdence  proﬁles  are  continuous.  One  likely  candidate 
for such a proﬁle is that given in Figure : in it, one’s degree of conﬁ-
dence over time is nearly as in Figure , but the corners of the proﬁle 
are “rounded o” so as to make the degree-of-conﬁdence function c (t) 
continuous for all t such that t < t < tn. Note that at this point no as-
sumption is being made that a normal human could have such a degree-
of-conﬁdence proﬁle; all that is being assumed, at least for now, is that 


















































































However, now we have trouble, for the degree-of-conﬁdence pro-
ﬁle given in Figure  is a counterexample to (-). As before, let αj 
be the last of our cases in which one counts as believing that one feels 
us grant to the objector that it does; even then we have not managed 
to save (-).
The objector concedes that if one’s degree-of-conﬁdence proﬁle 
during the course of the morning were as in Figure , then in every 
case in which one’s degree of conﬁdence that one feels cold is above 
the threshold for believing that one feels cold, that degree of conﬁ-
dence would be reliable enough to constitute knowledge. The reason 
that this possibility is not a problem for Williamson’s argument is that, 
given (), we know that human beings could not have such a de-
gree-of-conﬁdence proﬁle, for that would involve having drastically 
dierent degrees of conﬁdence in the same proposition in two suc-
cessive cases. However, this leaves open the possibility that other con-
ceivable beings could have degree-of-conﬁdence proﬁles that, while 
not as perfectly accurate as that in Figure , are still reliable enough 
to present a problem for (-). For surely it is not the case that 
any deviation whatsoever from the degree-of-conﬁdence proﬁle given 
in Figure  results in there being at least one case on the given morn-
ing in which one believes that one feels with a certain degree of con-
ﬁdence, but that degree of conﬁdence is not reliably enough based to 
constitute knowledge. To insist upon that would be to insist not just 
that reliability is required for knowledge, but moreover that perfect reli-
ability is required, and that way skepticism lies. So there must be some 
degree-of-conﬁdence proﬁles diering from that of Figure  such that, 
for every case in which one has sucient degree of conﬁdence that 
one feels cold to count as believing that one feels cold, that degree of 
conﬁdence is suciently reliable to qualify as knowledge.
Another salient feature of the degree-of-conﬁdence proﬁle in Figure 
, other than the fact that it depicts a perfectly reliable belief-forming 
mechanism, is the fact that the proﬁle is discontinuous: at the point at 
which one goes from feeling cold to not feeling cold, there is a sudden, 
discontinuous jump from one’s having degree of conﬁdence  that one 
feels cold to one’s having degree of conﬁdence  that one feels cold. 
Non-idealized physical systems rarely — if ever — exhibit discontinu-
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However,  by  the  criterion  of  reliability  being  proposed,  almost  no 
physical device would count as always being reliable enough for our 
purposes. For example, if a certain light is built to turn red whenever 
the temperature in some room is above °F, then in order for that 
light to qualify as suciently reliable for the entire time that it is in use, 
the light would have to discontinuously change in color at the precise 
instant at which the temperature in the room rises above °F; as no 
physically implemented light could ever do that, no real-world version 
of such a light would ever count as reliable in this way. But that seems 
far too demanding a standard of reliability: we can easily imagine a 
light built for this purpose that we would rely on, and be right to do so, 
without its color ever making such a discontinuous jump; indeed, we 
could even build such a light if we wanted. And if a requirement of 
discontinuity is too demanding when ascribing the label ‘reliable’ to 
physical devices, why should it fail to be too demanding when ascrib-
ing that label to human cognitive systems and their outputs?
Thus I take the various versions of the freezons example to show 
that  (-)  does  not  specify  a  genuine  necessary  condition  on 
knowledge. One reply on Williamson’s behalf would be to concede 
the point, but then try to ﬁnd some alternative to (-) that could 
still do the work necessary in justifying (). The basic idea would 
be to argue that, even if Figures  or  depict the freezon and degree-
of-conﬁdence proﬁles of a creature for whom the condition that one 
feels  cold  is  luminous,  humans  can  never  have  such  proﬁles,  even 
when they do everything they can to decide whether they feel cold, 
and so the condition in question is not luminous for creatures like us. 
However, I have grave doubts about the possibility of such a strategy’s 
concept knows, just as one might use the concept is reliable in arguing that a 
machine ill serves its purpose.”
. Williamson might insist that, at the precise instant at which the room’s tem-
perature  is  (say)  .°F,  our  light  does  not  qualify  as  reliable,  though  it 
may well have qualiﬁed as reliable several seconds earlier when the room’s 
temperature was (say) .°F. However, why say that? Why not say instead 
that the light was reliable enough for our purposes the entire time, though 
of course it could have been a bit more reliable when the temperature was 
.°F? To repeat a point made earlier: Williamson seems to be conﬂating 
sucient reliability at a given time with perfect reliability at that time.
cold, and let αj+ be the ﬁrst case in which one does not count as believ-
ing that one feels cold. Assuming as before a penumbral connection 
between ‘feels cold’ and ‘believes’, αj will also be the last case in which 
one feels cold, and αj+ the ﬁrst case in which one does not feel cold. 
Moreover, because the degree-of-conﬁdence proﬁle is continuous, we 
can always choose our αj and αj+ such that one’s degree of conﬁdence 
that one feels cold in αj+ is slightly lower than one’s degree of conﬁ-
dence that one feels cold in αj; if this isn’t the case when the interval 
between cases is one millisecond, we can make it so by choosing a 
smaller interval, such as one microsecond or one nanosecond. Then 
in αj one believes that one feels cold with a given degree of conﬁdence, 
and in suciently similar case αj+ one has a slightly lower degree of 
conﬁdence that one feels cold, despite its no longer being true that 
one feels cold. So according to (-), one’s belief in αj that one 
feels cold is not reliable enough to constitute knowledge. However, by 
assumption the degree-of-conﬁdence proﬁle in Figure  is one such 
that one’s belief that one feels cold always meets, for as long as it lasts, 
the minimum degree of reliability required for knowledge. So, lest we 
hold that only discontinuous, perfectly reliable degree-of-conﬁdence 
proﬁles such as that found in Figure  allow one’s belief that one feels 
cold to be reliably based in the way required for knowledge for the 
entire time it lasts, we must give up (-).
Could one resist this conclusion by insisting that, in order for one’s 
belief that one feels cold to be suitably reliably based for the entire 
morning, one’s degree of conﬁdence that one feels cold must indeed 
take a discontinuous drop once one stops feeling cold? Such a response 
is available, but it would divorce reliability talk in the case of knowl-
edge from reliability talk in other domains. A common way of motivat-
ing reliability constraints on knowledge is ﬁrst to note our practice of 
rating devices (such as thermometers) as reliable when they generally 
serve their purpose, and then to extend that idea to humans by think-
ing of our belief-forming mechanisms as nothing more than complex, 
biological devices for attaining true beliefs and avoiding false ones. 
. Cf. Williamson (), p. : “The use of the concept is reliable here is a way 
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conditions. So even if a suitable replacement for (-) could be 
found — which itself is highly doubtful — then the brunt of the argu-
mentative work in establishing that conditions such as that one feels 
cold are not luminous would still be left to be done.
õ $OõTHEõ2ELEVANTõ#ONSTITUTIVEõ#ONNECTIONSõ/BTAIN
I have presented two ways of attempting to derive the crucial prem-
ise in Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument from a safety require-
ment on knowledge: the ﬁrst attempted to derive that premise from 
a  coarse-grained  safety  requirement  formulated  in  terms  of  “all  or 
nothing” belief; the second attempted to derive it from a ﬁne-grained 
safety requirement formulated in terms of degrees of conﬁdence. In 
each case, the original version of the argument ran into problems: in 
the coarse-grained case, it proved impossible to derive the needed 
premise () from the coarse-grained safety requirement without 
appealing to a dubious sorites-premise-like bridge principle between 
successive cases; in the ﬁne-grained case, the proered ﬁne-grained 
safety requirement failed to specify a genuine necessary condition for 
knowledge. Moreover, in each case the best attempt at resuscitating a 
version of the argument — whether in the coarse-grained case by only 
running the argument until the ﬁrst case in which it is false that one 
feels cold, or in the ﬁne-grained case by proposing an alternative to 
the original (putative) ﬁne-grained safety requirement — was blocked 
by the possibility that there might be a certain sort of constitutive con-
nection between feeling cold and believing that one feels cold (in the 
coarse-grained case), or between the degree to which one feels cold 
and the degree to which one believes that one feels cold (in the ﬁne-
grained case).
Settling  to  what  extent,  if  any,  there  is  a  constitutive  connec-
tion — whether at the coarse-grained or ﬁned-grained level — between 
feeling cold and believing that one feels cold is beyond the scope of 
the current paper. But this much seems evident to me: there must be 
some sort of modal connection, constitutive or otherwise, between 
one’s phenomenal experiences (such as one’s feeling cold) and one’s 
ever succeeding. First, notice that it depends upon our being able to 
ﬁnd a new criterion for sorting the freezon/degree-of-conﬁdence pro-
ﬁles that result in one’s belief that one feels cold being reliable enough 
for knowledge during its entire duration from those that do not. How 
to decide upon this new criterion is a delicate aair: it’s just not clear 
what sort of constraints are in play that would allow us to sort the 
proﬁles in a suitably precise and yet non-arbitrary manner. But more 
importantly, once we have this new criterion in hand, we would then 
need an additional argument establishing that humans always fall on 
the unreliability side of the divide — that their degree-of-conﬁdence 
curves over time are of necessity too far from the sorts of curves given in 
Figures  or  for them to have a belief that they feel cold that is reliable 
for the entire time it lasts.
It is here that we run into a familiar problem. We saw in Section 
 that no version of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument that at-
tempts to derive () from a coarse-grained version of the safety 
requirement would succeed if there is a certain kind of constitutive 
connection between the coarse-grained states of feeling cold and be-
lieving that one feels cold. However, there might also be an analogous 
constitutive connection at the ﬁne-grained level between one’s feeling 
of cold as measured in freezons and one’s degree of conﬁdence that 
one feels cold. And moreover, this constitutive connection might be 
such that, whenever one has done everything one is in a position to 
do to decide whether one feels cold, the graphs over time of one’s feel-
ing of cold measured in freezons and one’s degree of conﬁdence that 
one feels cold would be as in Figures  or , or at least close enough 
to those graphs for one’s belief that one feels cold to count as reliable 
enough for knowledge during its entire duration. Of course, one might 
doubt that such a constitutive connection exists. But simply to assume 
that it does not, without oering any arguments in support of that 
assumption, would once again beg the main question at issue, since 
defenders of luminosity are typically motivated by the thought that 
there is a tight connection between the obtaining of certain conditions 
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the obtaining of the condition that one feels cold and one’s believing 
that the condition obtains, in order to extend his anti-luminosity argu-
ment to other conditions he would need to argue, on a case by case ba-
sis, that an analogous constitutive connection does not exist for each 
condition to which he applies the argument. For example, in order to 
use a coarse-grained version of the anti-luminosity argument to show 
that the condition it is rational for one to believe that p is not luminous, 
Williamson would have to establish that the following is not the case:
  (-)  If one has done everything one can to decide whether 
it is rational for one to believe that p, then one believes 
that it is rational for one to believe that p only if it is, in 
fact, rational for one to believe that p.
But for those who have internalist persuasions, the idea that in the 
limit of inquiry one cannot be wrong about what it is rational for one 
to believe is extremely plausible. So it will be dialectically dicult, if 
not impossible, to use a coarse-grained version of the anti-luminosity 
argument to motivate an externalist conception of rationality accord-
ing to which it can be rational for one to believe that p despite one’s 
not being in a position to know that it is rational for one to so believe. 
And similar comments apply to attempts to use the anti-luminosity ar-
gument (whether in its coarse-grained or ﬁne-grained form) to show 
that various other conditions, such as that it appears to one that q or that 
words X and Y have the same meaning for one, are not luminous: the con-
stitutive connection that Williamson must deny in order to make his 
argument work is often precisely what is at stake in claiming that the 
given condition is luminous.
Few would doubt that a version of Williamson’s argument can es-
tablish that an external-world condition such as that the temperature 
outside is less than °F is not luminous. We can imagine a morning on 
which the outside temperature starts at °F and then slowly warms 
up to °F, all while a given subject does nothing but carefully attend 
to whether the temperature outside feels to be less than °F. In this 
case, the analogue of () obviously holds: if at any time on the giv-
en morning one knows that the temperature outside is less than °F, 
cognitive states (such as one’s believing that one feels cold) — the phe-
nomenal and the cognitive cannot swing apart from each other any 
which way one likes. This is brought out by considering a thought 
experiment once proposed by Ernest Sosa in a very dierent context. 
Sosa has us imagine a subject who “has a beautifully coherent and 
comprehensive set of beliefs”, yet through the interference of a group 
of Cartesian evil demons, has sensory experiences that are “wildly at 
odds with his beliefs”. So, for example, the subject “believes he has a 
splitting headache, but he has no headache at all; he believes he has 
a cubical piece of black coal before him, while his visual experience is 
as if he had a white and round snowball before him,” and so on. Sosa 
takes this case to be a counterexample to any theory of justiﬁcation 
that makes reference only to one’s beliefs and the relations between 
them, since presumably that theory would deem the subject’s beliefs 
to be fully justiﬁed, whereas Sosa insists that there still seems to be 
something epistemically blameworthy about our subject. However, my 
reaction to this example is quite dierent: I fail to see why Sosa’s case 
should trouble anyone, since it seems clear to me that the scenario as 
described is impossible — that there could not be a being who counts as 
having experiences and beliefs even though they are radically disjoint 
from one another in the way Sosa imagines. Moreover, once one tries 
to explain why such a being could not exist, one soon ﬁnds oneself 
using phrases like “constitutive connection”. Of course, it is one thing 
to say that a subject cannot have a fully coherent set of beliefs that 
are wildly at odds with most of her experiences, and quite another to 
say that, after ideal reﬂection, a subject cannot believe that she feels 
cold without really feeling cold. But I take Sosa’s example to strongly 
motivate the idea that there must be some sort of modal connection 
between the phenomenal and the cognitive realms. Whether that con-
nection is a constitutive one, and whether it is a tight enough connec-
tion to block Williamson’s argument, are topics for another day.
Note,  however,  that  even  if  Williamson  were  somehow  able  to 
prove that the relevant constitutive connection does not hold between 
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does not do this by standing outside of oneself, as it were, and using a 
quasi-perceptual faculty to detect the goings-on within.
One of the upshots of Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument is 
supposed to be that, because we have no cognitive home of mental 
states whose obtaining we are always in a position to know of, the 
type of epistemic access we have to our own mental states is quali-
tatively no dierent from the type of epistemic access we have to ex-
ternal-world conditions: the dierence is a matter of degree, not of 
kind. But if my arguments are correct, then there is a sense in which 
for Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument to have any chance of suc-
ceeding, he must already assume that conclusion, since he must as-
sume that there is not a special, tight connection between, say, our 
feelings of cold and our beliefs about those feelings, or between the 
degree to which we feel cold and the degree to which we believe that 
we feel cold. If Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument succeeds, then 
it is possible for us to be epistemically disengaged (that is, disengaged at 
the level of knowledge) from our mental states, the meanings of our 
words, and what rationality demands of us; but he can only establish 
that conclusion by assuming that, even after ideal reﬂection, we can be 
doxastically disengaged (that is, disengaged at the level of belief) from 
a given mental state, the meaning of a given word, or a given demand 
of rationality.
õ #ODAõ4HEõ,USTROUSõANDõTHEõ,UMINOUS
I would like to end with a few brief comments about the scope of 
Williamson’s argument.
I take the arguments in Sections – to show that Williamson does 
not successfully demonstrate that every non-trivial condition is non-
luminous. However, even if I am wrong and Williamson’s argument 
. If Williamson’s epistemicist theory of vagueness is false, there will be a sec-
ond important disanalogy between Williamson’s argument as applied to the 
condition that the temperature outside is less than °F and his argument as ap-
plied to a condition such as that one feels cold, since the former but not the 
latter condition will have a sharp cut-o point between the cases in which it 
obtains and those in which it does not.
then one millisecond later the temperature must still be less than °F. 
Even if somehow one stops believing that the temperature outside 
is less than °F at precisely the point at which the temperature ﬁrst 
reaches °F, or even if one’s degree of conﬁdence in that proposition 
suddenly takes a sharp drop when the proposition ﬁrst becomes false, 
such an occurrence would seem to be nothing more than a fortuitous 
accident: given the inexactness of our abilities to detect the external 
temperature around us, there must be some suciently similar situa-
tions in which one does not stop believing (or in which one’s degree 
of conﬁdence does not signiﬁcantly drop) at that ﬁrst point at which 
the outside temperature stops being less than °F. It is only a short 
step from there to concluding that, regardless of what one’s coarse- or 
ﬁne-grained beliefs are like in the actual world, on the given morning 
one does not know that the temperature outside is less than °F if 
one millisecond later it is not.
However, for the defender of luminosity, it is not a fortuitous acci-
dent that, when one carefully considers the matter, one’s beliefs about 
whether one feels cold perfectly line up with the facts about whether 
one feels cold. That this could happen would seem miraculous if one 
holds an inner perception model of self-knowledge according to which in-
trospection is fundamentally no dierent from perception via the ﬁve 
senses: if our faculty for forming beliefs about our own mental states 
were essentially just an eye turned inward, then given the inevitable 
inexactness of our external perceptual faculties, it would seem that 
our inner belief-forming mechanisms must be irremediably inexact as 
well. But few, if any, of Williamson’s targets hold such a conception of 
self-knowledge. Thus for most defenders of luminosity claims there 
is an important disanalogy between Williamson’s argument as applied 
to the condition that the temperature outside is less than °F and his ar-
gument as applied to a condition such as that one feels cold: in the lat-
ter case it is one’s own mind that one is forming beliefs about, and one 
. For a survey of the various views of self-knowledge that do not involve an 
inner perception model, see Gertler () and the references contained 
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α, and it is trivially true that in α one believes that p on the same ba-
sis and with the same degree of conﬁdence as one believes that p in 
α. For this reason, the safety requirement for knowledge implies that 
knowledge is factive: one knows that p in some case α only if it is true 
that p in α. And a safety requirement for justiﬁed belief would have 
exactly the same implication: according to such a constraint, one is 
justiﬁed in believing that p in a case α only if in some set of suciently 
similar cases, it is true that p; as α will be among that set, it will follow 
that justiﬁed belief is factive. However, we can be justiﬁed in believ-
ing falsehoods: for instance, I might be justiﬁed in believing that my 
copy of Knowledge and Its Limits is sitting on my desk at home even if 
this belief is false because, unbeknownst to me, someone broke into 
my apartment and stole the book. So there can be no safety constraint 
for justiﬁed belief.
Thus if we try to show that the condition that one feels cold is not 
lustrous by running an argument parallel to the one that Williamson 
uses to argue that that condition is not luminous, we will be unable to 
appeal to a safety requirement for justiﬁed belief in order to secure the 
analogue of premise (), which would read as follows:
  (-)  For every integer i ( ≤ i < n), if in αi one is justiﬁed 
in believing that one feels cold, then in αi+ one feels 
cold.
(-) simply does not have the same plausibility as (). It seems 
perfectly plausible that one could not feel cold in αi+ and yet have been 
justiﬁed in believing one millisecond earlier that one felt cold; indeed, 
if αi+ is one of the ﬁrst few cases on the morning in question in which 
it is not the case that one feels cold, it seems perfectly plausible that 
. Note that false beliefs can be justiﬁed even on Williamson’s view according 
to which (i) evidence is what justiﬁes belief, and (ii) one’s evidence is all and 
only what one knows (“E  =  K  ”): even though on this view one’s evidence only 
consists of true propositions, in some circumstances that evidence might be 
misleading and thus probabilify falsehoods.
does succeed in showing, say, that one can be in pain without being in 
a position to know that one is pain, it would not follow that we could 
use an analogous argument to show that one can be in pain without 
being in a position to justiﬁably believe that one is in pain. Continuing 
with Williamson’s light-giving metaphor, let us say that a condition  is 
lustrous if and only if the following holds:
  (**)  For every case α, if in α condition  obtains, then in α one 
is in a position to justiﬁably believe that  obtains.
A condition that is lustrous shines of its own accord, though not nec-
essarily as brightly as one that is luminous, for the two notions can 
pull apart: one’s position could be such that, if one were to believe 
that the condition in question obtains, then one’s belief would be 
justiﬁed, without the justiﬁcation that one would thereby have being 
sucient to make one’s true belief constitute knowledge. And though 
Williamson’s argument might well show that the condition that one 
feels cold is not luminous, a parallel argument cannot be used to show 
that the condition that one feels cold is not lustrous, for while it might 
be true that knowledge requires safety from error, it is completely im-
plausible to suppose that justiﬁed belief requires safety from error.
Or, rather, it is completely implausible to suppose that justiﬁed be-
lief requires safety from error, given the common assumption that it 
is possible to justiﬁably believe a falsehood. According to the safety 
requirement on knowledge, one knows that p in a given case α only 
if in some set of suciently similar cases, it is true that p. What de-
termines that set will vary depending on which version of the safety 
constraint one is working with: perhaps it is all suciently similar 
cases in which one believes that p, or all suciently similar cases in 
which one believes that p on a suciently similar basis as in α, or all 
suciently similar cases in which one’s degree of conﬁdence that p is 
at most slightly less than in α. (See Sections –, above.) But regard-
less of how one determines the set of suciently similar cases, α will 
itself be among that set, for α itself is as similar as a case can be to      Luminosity Regained
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